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I. INTRODUCTION
This Symposium contributes to a wealth of scholarship in the area of
Critical Race Theory (CRT). The Symposium arises out of a CRT
Workshop held in April 2003 at the American University Washington
College of Law. The organizers of the workshop1 hoped to spark new
directions in the scholarly analysis of racial injustice and to reflect upon
critiques of CRT from both “insiders” (internal critics) and “outsiders”
(external critics). While earlier workshops provided the necessary
intellectual space for “founding” scholars in the field,2 the last formal CRT
Workshop (prior to 2003) was held in June 1997 at Tulane Law School.3
While these workshops do not represent the exclusive venue for thinking
and writing about progressive racial theory, the organizers of the
Washington College of Law CRT Workshop believed that reviving of the
annual CRT Workshop would engender renewed interest in critical race
analysis, initiate new theoretical directions for CRT research, and provide a
forum for reflecting upon and responding to internal and external critiques
of progressive race scholarship. The works published in this Symposium
effectuate this purpose.
Any body of legal research endures—as it should—intellectual critique
and engagement.4 As such, a wide body of literature, both progressive and
conservative, has emerged in recent years that disputes Critical Race
Theorists on many issues.5 The earliest external critiques of CRT
challenged the embrace of race consciousness among Critical Race
Theorists and critiqued the usage of storytelling in their writings.6 Later,
external critics dusted off the attacks on storytelling but added a new
dimension: the second-stage conservative critics assailed CRT for being
nihilistic and unduly cynical.7 While many able scholars have rebutted the
central claims of this literature, the argument concerning CRT’s supposed
nihilism should receive more scholarly attention, particularly in light of

1. Pamela Bridgewater, Devon Carbado, Darren Hutchinson, and Leti Volpp
organized the CRT Workshop.
2. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, The First Decade: Critical Reflections, or “A
Foot in the Closing Door,” in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE
THEORY 9, 18-22 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the importance of CRT
Workshops).
3. See Stephanie L. Phillips, The Convergence of the Critical Race Theory Workshop
with LatCrit Theory: A History, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1247, 1248 (1999) (offering a
chronology of CRT Workshops).
4. See bell hooks, Censorship from Left to Right, in OUTLAW CULTURE: RESISTING
REPRESENTATIONS 63-72 (1994) (discussing the importance of dissent and critique within
progressive social movements).
5. See generally infra Part III (discussing internal and external critiques of critical race
analysis).
6. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
7. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
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efforts by many Critical Race Theorists to develop programmatic or policy
agendas for a contemporary racial justice movement.8
During the “formative” years of CRT, most of the internal critics focused
attention on questions concerning the complexity and multiplicity of
identity and subordination.9 Many scholars urged Critical Race Theorists
to move beyond a “single-axis” analysis of racial subordination and
identity and to develop intersectional or multidimensional frameworks of
analysis.10 Other internal scholars challenged the “black/white paradigm”
of CRT and urged theorists to conduct multiracial analyses of racial
inequality.11 Today, multiracial and multidimensional analyses have
become leading methodologies within CRT and have even influenced
judicial decision-making.12
Recent internal critiques push Critical Race Theorists into different
directions. Several internal critics, for example, have argued that CRT
should abandon its embrace of race consciousness, which occupies a
central space within CRT and other progressive racial discourses, because
race is “socially constructed,” rather than “real,” and because race has been
the source of brutality, repression, and inequality.13 Other internal critics
contend that multiplicity theories and other identity discourses detract from
what should be the broader goal of critical race analysis: a critique of the
material or economic harms caused by racial injustice.14 While several
scholars have offered constructive critiques of the internal critics’
“progressive race blindness” thesis,15 the claim that identity theories divert
needed energies away from a discussion of economic deprivation lacks
significant critical engagement.16
This Article contributes to the completion of some “unfinished business”
within CRT by engaging insufficiently examined external and internal
critiques of critical race scholarship. The external critique of critical race
nihilism and the new insider critique that dichotomizes identity theories
and material harm warrant extended reflection because there are critical
deficiencies that problematize these arguments.17 The nihilism critique, for
example, falsely associates CRT with more radical forms of
postmodernism and overlooks leading works in CRT which demonstrate
that Critical Race Theorists inhabit an admittedly contradictory space.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
See discussion infra Part III.A.
See discussion infra Parts III.A.1-2.
See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
But see infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part III.C.
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Critical Race Theorists radically deconstruct the racial hierarchies that law
constitutes and reinforces, and simultaneously, they utilize both law and
reason to advocate for racial justice.18 Whether or not Critical Race
Theorists can sufficiently balance these conflicting positions exists apart
from the false charge that CRT is ultimately fatalistic.19 Furthermore,
CRT’s cynicism exists, in part, because the problem of racial injustice
seems intractable; yet, the law, rather than offering solicitude to
disadvantaged groups, largely reflects majoritarian interests.20 While
Critical Race Theorists have persuasively unveiled the “whiteness” of
United States legal institutions, they could fortify their claims by using
empirical research in political science scholarship which demonstrates how
legal institutions—particularly the Supreme Court—cater to majoritarian,
rather than minority, interests.21 If this research is accurate, then the
conservative critics’ animosity toward CRT’s cynicism is misplaced; the
Critical Race Theorists have reason to express alarm.
Insider critiques of CRT also require critical assessment. Recent internal
critics
complain
that
racial
identity
discourse,
including
multidimensionality theory, marginalizes more important attention to
material, class, or economic issues.22 If their claim holds true, the material
harm critics serve a vital purpose: because racial injustice causes and
interacts with economic deprivation, any progressive racial justice
movement should interrogate class and economic inequality concerns.23
Nevertheless, the analysis of the material harm critics suffers because it
dichotomizes class and multidimensionality.24 Although these critics
bifurcate multiplicity and class analysis, multiplicity theories relate to class
analysis in two important respects.25 First, poverty has multidimensional
sources. Gender, sexuality, race, and other factors contribute to economic
disadvantage.26 Accordingly, an accurate account of economic inequality
must consider the multidimensionality of structures of subordination.
Second, poverty (alongside race, gender, class, and sexuality) is a source of
identity construction and social group experiences; as such, any
comprehensive analysis of identity should take class into account.27

18. See infra Part III.C.2.
19. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 1996, at
27 (criticizing as fatalistic CRT’s rejection of law to achieve social change, along with its
contention that facially neutral laws “fuel white domination”).
20. See infra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
21. Id.
22. See discussion infra Part III.C.1.
23. See infra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
26. Id.
27. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
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This Article explicates my thesis in three parts. Part II sets forth an
“intellectual history” of CRT, isolating the central historical and social
forces that gave rise to its development as a body of jurisprudential
research.28 Part III discusses both historical and recent insider and external
critiques of CRT and relates these critiques to the development of critical
race methodologies.29 Part III offers new perspectives on outsider critiques
that describe CRT as nihilistic and on insider critiques that bifurcate
multiplicity theories and class.30 Part IV “introduces” the works of this
Symposium and connects them to ongoing theoretical projects within
CRT.31
II. CRT: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
Many scholars have devoted attention to analyzing the evolution and
thematic content of CRT.32 As such, this Part offers only a brief historical
examination of CRT, highlighting important factors that shaped the early
interventions and later transformations of CRT.
The introduction to Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That
Formed the Movement33 provides the most succinct and poignant
description of CRT. CRT, the book’s authors observe, represents a
progressive insurgency within traditional civil rights discourse and a racial
insurgency within existing progressive legal discourse, such as Critical
Legal Studies (CLS).34 As the remainder of this Part reveals, CRT has
agreed with, but departed from, CLS and traditional civil rights discourse in
many important respects.
A. A Racial Intervention in CLS
CRT developed in the late-1980s at a time when conservative Supreme
Court doctrine was eroding many of the gains made by the 1960s civil
rights movement.35 Doctrines such as standing,36 colorblindness,37 and the
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
Id.
See infra Part IV.
See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION (2001); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT xiii-xxxii (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter THE KEY
WRITINGS]; MARI J. MATSUDA, WHERE IS YOUR BODY?: AND OTHER ESSAYS ON RACE
GENDER AND THE LAW 47-59 (1996).
33. THE KEY WRITINGS, supra note 32, at xiii.
34. See id. at xix (observing that CRT represents a “left intervention into race discourse
and a race intervention into left discourse”).
35. Id. at xvi-xvii.
36. See generally Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
1422, 1422, 1496 (1995) (critiquing racial disparities in the application of standing doctrine
that deprive people of color of civil rights remedies and concluding that a showing of
Supreme Court racial discrimination is inconsequential because it has long served a
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discriminatory intent rule38 limited access to the Court by subordinate
groups,39 curtailed the availability of judicial remedies to plaintiffs properly
before the Court,40 and made it extraordinarily difficult for states and
Congress to address questions of racial inequality.41 Early Critical Race
Theorists critically assessed Court doctrine. Echoing themes in other
progressive legal discourses, primarily CLS, Critical Race Theorists argued
that the law reinforces racial hierarchy, reflects the viewpoints of privileged
classes, serves as a weak vehicle for social change, is indeterminate and
unable to provide fixed, predictable outcomes for civil rights litigants, and
is inherently non-neutral (and biased towards the protection of societal
privilege).42
While Critical Race Theorists appreciated CLS’s poststructuralist
questioning of the law and legal reasoning, Critical Race Theorists and
CLS scholars diverged in one important respect: while many CLS scholars
sought to discard using the law as an instrument of progressive social
change, Critical Race Theorists, recognizing the historical role that law has
played in the advancement of the material and social status of persons of
color, exhibited a commitment (in varying degrees) to the institution and
structure of law.43 In a symposium published by the Harvard Civil RightsCivil Liberties Law Review, Critical Race Theorists asserted that the
“whiteness” of CLS scholars prevented those writers from appreciating the
value of law and rights discourse to persons of color.44 Although law is
imperfect, it remains a vehicle for persons of color to demand justice and to
represent the varied harms of racial subordination.45 As a result, the
majoritarian purpose).
37. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 36-37 (1991) (criticizing colorblind constitutional doctrine as perpetuating racial
hierarchy).
38. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 388 (1987) (assessing the discriminatory
intent rule as limiting racial equality and contending that judicial evaluation of
governmental action with racially discriminary impact may uncover unconscious racism).
39. See Spann, supra note 36, at 1424, 1455 (demonstrating how standing doctrine
limits access to the courts by persons of color).
40. See Lawrence, supra note 38, at 353-54, 376-78 (discussing how the discriminatory
intent rule sharply curtails the availability of judicial relief in equal protection cases).
41. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race”:
The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U.
ILL. L. REV. 615, 646, 654 (discussing the impact of colorblindness upon remedial usages of
race).
42. Angela P. Harris, Foreword: A Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV.
741, 745-50 (1994).
43. See id. at 750-51 (discussing the rift between CRT and CLS over efficacy of rights).
44. Symposium, Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1987).
45. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies
Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 303-07 (1987) (arguing that
persons of color, unlike CLS scholars, value rights due to their vulnerable status in racial
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experiences of subordinate persons reflect a “dual consciousness”46—a
simultaneous respect and disdain for law and legal institutions. Patricia
Williams, for example, argues that:
To say that blacks never fully believed in rights is true; yet it is also true
that blacks believed in them so much and so hard that we gave them life
where there was none before. We held onto them, put the hope of them
into our wombs, and mothered them—not just the notion of them. We
nurtured rights and gave rights life. And this was not the dry process of
reification, from which life is drained and reality fades as the cement of
conceptual determinism hardens round—but its opposite. This was the
resurrection of life from 400-year-old ashes; the parthenogenesis of
unfertilized hope.47

The desire to integrate postmodern skepticism toward the law within a
modern framework of law and reason thus became a central theme in
critical race scholarship.48 And as Angela Harris has persuasively argued,
rather than resisting this inherent contradiction and attempting to decide
“which” strand (postmodern or modern, deconstructionist or
reconstructionist) should dominate critical race analysis, Critical Race
Theorists should “inhabit that very tension.”49
Critical Race Theorists have largely followed Harris’ thoughtful advice.
While Critical Race Theorists continue to unveil the malleability of law,
the intractability of racism, and the socially constructed nature of race, they
also offer doctrinal and policy reforms in a host of legal contexts.50
B. A Progressive Intervention in Civil Rights Discourse
Although Critical Race Theorists appreciate the value of law in the
betterment of the lives of persons of color, they also understand that law is
a problematic instrument for progressive social movements.51 Some
hierarchy).
46. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 341 (1987) (“The minority experience of
dual consciousness accommodates both the idea of legal indeterminacy as well as the core
belief in a liberating law that transcends indeterminacy.”).
47. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 430 (1987) (internal citation omitted).
48. See Harris, supra note 42, at 745-55 (discussing the tension in CRT that results
from its simultaneous embrace of CLS and traditional liberal discourse).
49. Id. at 760 (internal citation omitted).
50. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women
of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1480-82 (1991)
(proposing an equal protection remedy for the criminalization of prenatal drug use among
black women by linking governmental obligations to the rights of privacy and racial
equality); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1383 (1991) (arguing that
antidiscrimination law should recognize claims of “accent discrimination”).
51. See Harris, supra note 42, at 749-50 (discussing disenchantment with the law
among Critical Race Theorists).
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Critical Race Theorists even question whether the United States can ever
transcend its racism.52 While Critical Race Theorists understand that the
establishment of formal equality has improved the status and material
conditions of persons of color, formal equality has a limited impact.53 A
regime of formal equality cannot complete the project of racial equality
because it: (1) does not address the material harms caused by racism;
(2) does not disturb subtle or unconscious racism; (3) does not treat as
impermissible laws that negatively impact subordinate groups (regardless
of the intent of lawmakers); and (4) treats as suspicious, explicit or
remedial usages of race.54
The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence illuminates the severe
limitations of a regime of formal equality and its adverse effects upon
racial justice. In a series of decisions, the Court has construed the Equal
Protection Clause as prohibiting race-based state action.55 In order to
justify race consciousness, the governmental actor must provide a
compelling justification for its use of race and demonstrate that the
classification is narrowly connected to the policy end.56 The Court’s
colorblindness doctrine certainly helped persons of color when laws overtly
and intentionally sought to subordinate them.
In other words,
colorblindness was a sensible doctrine during an historical era where
racism was openly encoded in law and policy.
Today, however, most state actors do not explicitly legislate or
promulgate policies on the basis of race.57 The Civil Rights Movement
created a change in social structure; American society now disfavors raceconscious state action.58 Consequently, the only laws or policies that
openly utilize race are typically remedial in nature. Contemporary raceconscious laws seek to benefit—rather than harm—socially marginalized
52. Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992).
53. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1378
(1988) (“[T]he attainment of formal equality is not the end of the story. Racial hierarchy
cannot be cured by the move to facial race-neutrality in the laws that structure the economic,
political, and social lives of Black people.”).
54. See Hutchinson, supra note 41, at 637-81 (demonstrating how equal protection
doctrine legitimates “neutral” laws that harm socially disadvantaged groups but invalidates
“facially discriminatory” laws that seek to eradicate subordination).
55. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (“Racial
classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection
between justification and classification.”).
56. Id.
57. See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know
How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1169 (1991) (“Where
discrimination is illegal or socially disapproved, social scientists predict that it will be
practiced only when it is possible to do so covertly and indirectly.”) (citation omitted).
58. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms
of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1135 (1997) (observing that
United States culture embraces equal opportunity).
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groups.59 White state actors who implement affirmative action plans do not
consider race to subjugate whites, but to remedy the harms caused by racial
subordination and to diversify important social institutions. Nevertheless,
the Court’s colorblindness doctrine demands symmetry: governmental race
consciousness requires strict scrutiny regardless of whether it seeks to harm
or to benefit persons of color.60 This lack of context in the Court’s race
jurisprudence has made it extremely difficult for the states and Congress to
remedy the effects of racial discrimination.61 The Court has utilized the
strict scrutiny doctrine primarily to strike down or to limit remedies rather
than to affirm them.62
Concurrent with its application of colorblindness, the Court also treats as
presumptively constitutional laws or policies that are facially neutral but
which disparately affect disadvantaged classes.63 Although Court doctrine
permits the introduction of statistical impact evidence to prove
discriminatory intent, the Court has invariably discounted impact studies in
equal protection (and statutory) antidiscrimination cases and has made it
clear that impact alone, disconnected from a finding of intent, does not
substantiate a claim of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.64
The discriminatory intent rule has placed high barriers before civil rights
litigants.65 This rule essentially requires that a plaintiff present a court with
“smoking gun” evidence at a time when overt manifestations of racial bias
are highly suspicious and well-policed. As a consequence, the Court has
rejected claims of discrimination where discriminatory patterns mirror
historical legacies of extreme racial subjugation,66 where parties present
highly sophisticated statistical studies documenting the influence of race in

59. See Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 HOW. L.J. 1, 5
(1995) (describing affirmative action as “the race-conscious allocation of resources
motivated by an intent to benefit racial minorities”).
60. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (“[T]he standard of review under the Equal Protection
Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification.”) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989)
(plurality opinion)).
61. See Spann, supra note 59, at 65 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s failure to
recognize motive in the context of affirmative action disregards “the only distinction that
exists between affirmative action and discrimination”).
62. See id. at 65-66 (discussing the Court’s hostility toward affirmative action).
63. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (acknowledging the
reluctance of the Court to declare laws unconstitutional based on the presence of a racially
disproportionate impact, without assessing the presence of a racially discriminatory
purpose).
64. See id. (holding that despite discriminatory impact, equal protection plaintiffs must
prove intentional discrimination).
65. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1105, 1113 (1989) (noting that under the specific intent standard, evidence of disparate
effect is of little use to plaintiffs).
66. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)
(dismissing probative value of racial impact in a housing discrimination case).
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state action,67 and where the discriminatory patterns themselves are clearly
foreseeable.68 Finding no intentional discrimination, the Court has applied
low-level rational basis review and largely upheld challenged policies in
equal protection impact cases.69
Together, the colorblindness and impact rules demonstrate the pitfalls of
an exclusive reliance on formal equality as a vehicle for racial justice. The
Court, wedded to the notion of colorblindness, applies strict scrutiny to
governmental policies aimed to alleviate the harms caused by racism, but it
remains deferential in the face of laws that, while facially neutral,
disparately affect historically protected groups. These doctrines leave
subordinate classes vulnerable to facially neutral—though harmful—state
action, and they prevent state actors from remedying the discrimination
these groups continue to face.70
In an effort to interject progressive values into the terrain of civil rights
jurisprudence, many Critical Race Theorists have criticized formal equality
regimes.71 Their research has pushed legal theorists to consider solutions to
the problem of racial inequality that do more than simply establish formal
rules that prohibit discriminatory acts by state actors.
III. CRT: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CRITIQUES
Cultural critic bell hooks has observed that progressive social
movements mature in response to critical inquiry from within their ranks.
Hooks notes that “any progressive political movement grows and matures
only to the degree that it passionately welcomes and encourages, in both
theory and practice, diversity of opinion, new ideas, critical exchange, and
dissent.”72 This assertion certainly holds true in the context of CRT, as its
evolution has depended largely upon very vigorous internal criticism.
Although Critical Race Theorists have not always passionately welcomed

67. See Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1073 (1998)
(critiquing the Court’s dismissal of “sophisticated and comprehensive statistical evidence”
in equal protection litigation).
68. See Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (upholding state
preference for veterans in employment settings despite the foreseeable, gross disparate
effect of the policy upon women).
69. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 250-52 (1976) (applying rational
basis review and upholding municipal hiring policy with a disparate racial effect).
70. See Hutchinson, supra note 41, at 637-73 (providing an extensive critique of this
particular aspect of equal protection doctrine).
71. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 53, at 1384 (discussing the symbolism behind
removing formal barriers, and the unlikelihood that this action would change hierarchical
relationships between whites and blacks “until the way in which race consciousness
perpetuates norms that legitimate Black subordination is revealed”).
72. See hooks, supra note 4, at 65-66 (noting how the early feminist movement did not
welcome discussion on race and racism).
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such critiques,73 the relative openness of CRT has allowed for substantial
innovation of its intellectual agenda.
Internal critics have also challenged Critical Race Theorists, and their
arguments have shaped the direction of critical race analysis as well—if
only by generating rebuttals to these very critiques. This Part discusses the
influence of internal and external critiques upon critical race analysis and
then responds directly to some important critiques with which Critical Race
Theorists have not yet exhaustively engaged.
A. Innovation in CRT: Reckoning with Internal Critiques
Much of the evolution and development of CRT has resulted from
internal critiques of the theory. The predominant internal critiques of CRT
focus on questions of multiplicity, essentialism, and exclusion.
Specifically, these critiques have argued that Critical Race Theorists
essentialize persons of color by omitting gender, sexuality, and class from
analysis, thereby excluding women of color74 and gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals of color.75 Other internal critics have contested the “black/white
paradigm” of racial discourse, arguing that CRT focuses primarily on
black/white racial issues, to the exclusion of Native American, Asian
American and Latino concerns.76
1.

Intersectionality: the race/gender critiques
The feminist critiques of CRT have contributed heavily to the concept of
subordination among Critical Race Theorists. Leading Critical Race
Feminists include Kimberlé Crenshaw,77 Angela Harris,78 Dorothy
73. Phillips, supra note 3, at 1250-51.
74. See generally CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2d
ed. 2003) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM] (developing areas of legal scholarship
where purportedly neutral analyses excluded the experiences and realities of women of
color).
75. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race:
Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory, and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 7
(1999) (arguing that the work of CRT scholars who do not perform a multidimensional
analysis perpetuates heterosexism and the marginalization of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender people of color).
76. See Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal
Science” of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213, 1253 (1997) (noting that civil
rights discourse and struggle affects everyone and should therefore include everyone);
Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory,
Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1267 (1993) (stating that
the omission of Asian American perspectives from CRT forecloses a more nuanced
understanding of racism in the United States).
77. See, e.g., Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242-43
(1991) (asserting that intersecting patterns of racism and sexism frequently produce violence
against women of color).
78. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (discussing how feminist legal theorists privilege the
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Roberts,79 Berta Hernández-Truyol,80 Leti Volpp,81 and Adrien Wing.82
These scholars have contested the single-issue paradigms of antiracist and
feminist discourse that focuses exclusively on race or gender as dimensions
of subordination, to the exclusion of the intersection of race and gender
analysis.83
When Critical Race Theorists eliminate gender from their analysis, the
resulting theories rest on the experiences of, and respond to the needs of,
men of color.84 Furthermore, essentialist racial discourse obfuscates the
multiple harms that racism causes. Due to the “intersection” of racism and
patriarchy, racism has gendered effects, and patriarchy exists in a racialized
context.85 Thus, intersectionality scholars have examined the structural
elements of race, and they have also extended their rich analysis to
doctrinal and policy contexts.86 As a result of intersectional analysis,
feminist concerns occupy a prominent space within contemporary CRT,
and the work of these theorists has influenced legal actors.87

“abstract and unitary voice,” and silence the voices of women of color).
79. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 50, at 1424 (criticizing feminist literature on
reproductive rights for adopting a white, middle class perspective, and neglecting the
concerns of poor women of color).
80. See, e.g., Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Borders (En)Gendered:
Normativities, Latinas, and a LatCrit Paradigm, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 882, 921 (1997)
(recognizing that Latina inclusion requires a non-essentialist model that incorporates race,
ethnicity, nationhood, gender, and culture).
81. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the “Cultural
Defense”, 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 93-94 (1994) (arguing that any analysis of cultural
defenses must consider gendered power relationships within communities as well as cultural
differences between communities).
82. See, e.g., Adrien Katherine Wing, Introduction to CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra
note 74, at 7 (arguing that Critical Race Feminism enhanced CRT by articulating that
“women of color are not merely white women plus color or men of color plus gender”).
83. See Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of
Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1188-89 (1991) (urging scholars to work in a coalition, to
study patterns of oppression, and to recognize that “all forms of subordination are
interlocking and mutually reinforcing”).
84. See Crenshaw, supra note 77, at 1252 (asserting that the “specific raced and
gendered experiences [of men of color and white women], although intersectional, often
define as well as confine the interests of the entire group”).
85. See Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181,
1207-08 (2001) (criticizing feminist scholars in the United States for failing to address
various social, political, and economic issues, including racism, that shape gender
subordination).
86. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 50, at 1428-36 (discussing gender and race in the
context of criminal law enforcement); Crenshaw, supra note 77, at 1251-82 (discussing
gender and race in the context of gender violence policy).
87. See, e.g., Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994) (drawing on
Crenshaw’s intersectionality theory to argue that attempts to “bisect a person’s identity” to
prove that gender or race-based discrimination would distort the court’s analysis of the
particular nature of discrimination against women of color).
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2.

Multidimensionality: race, gender, sexuality, and class
The feminist critiques of CRT have led to additional intellectual
inquiries. Specifically, the intersectionality critiques have influenced
scholars whose work analyzes the relationship between sexuality, race,
class, and gender.88 The “race-sexuality” critics have endeavored to
advance the intersectional analysis both substantially and conceptually.
The race-sexuality theorists have advanced intersectional analysis
substantively by considering the interaction of race and sexual identity,
which intersectionality theorists largely ignore.89 The race-sexuality
theorists, however, have done more than simply insert another category of
experience, such as sexual orientation, into pre-existing intersectionality
theory. Rather, the race-sexuality theorists have tried to advance the
conceptual lens of race utilized by CRT beyond the important insights that
Critical Race Feminists have made. For example, while Critical Race
Feminists have viewed intersectionality as a condition that affects the
“multiply burdened,”90 primarily or exclusively, multidimensionality
scholars have treated multiplicity as a “universal” concept—one facing all
members of subordinate groups.91 Thus, the interaction of whiteness and
gayness has important implications for racial theory, as much as the
interaction of blackness and womanhood.
By interrogating the convergence of privilege and subordination, rather
than only “intersecting” subordination, multidimensionality theorists have
uncovered the inherent contradictions in the arguments of essentialist
scholars who view multiplicity theories as destructive to progressive social
movements.92 Once we treat multiplicity as a universal concept, then no
group can claim to represent a “pure” race claim or to merit a central
88. See generally Hutchinson, supra note 75, at 9-17 (advocating a multidimensional
analysis of oppression that includes the diverse ways in which privilege and disadvantage
intersect); Francisco Valdes, Queer Margins, Queer Ethics: A Call to Account for Race and
Ethnicity in the Law, Theory, and Politics of “Sexual Orientation,” 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1293,
1338-40 (1997) (urging scholars to go beyond intersectionality, and look at the complex
interplay of racism, sexism and heterosexism as mutually-reinforcing oppressions).
89. I have written extensively on the distinctions between intersectionality and
multidimensionality, and I have theorized the latter. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an
Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 307-13 (2001) [hereinafter
“Hutchinson, Identity Crises”] (explaining how multidimensionality goes beyond
intersectionality to recognize heterosexism and universality); Hutchinson, supra note 75, at
9-17 (discussing substantive and conceptual similarities and differences between the two
theories).
90. See, e.g., Wing, supra note 82, at 7-8 (noting that Critical Race Feminism
concentrates on “those women of color who face multiple discrimination”).
91. See Hutchinson, supra note 75, at 15-16 (arguing that a multidimensional analysis
must recognize the role privilege plays in the lives of subordinated groups).
92. See id. at 16-17 (arguing that a multidimensional approach recognizes that, for
example, race and gender are integral issues to gay rights because although a gay white man
may suffer from heterosexism, he is privileged by gender and race).
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position in antiracist politics and theory.93 Arguments to the contrary are
both inaccurate and discriminatory. Today, many Critical Race Theorists
have recognized multidimensionality as a natural progression of
intersectionality.94
3.

Multiracial politics
A third area of critical race innovation involves multiracial politics.
Internal critics have argued that racial discourse in the United States fixates
upon black/white racial issues, thereby marginalizing Latino, Native
Empirically, this
American, and Asian American experiences.95
observation is indisputable. Race theorists lack a full understanding of the
breadth of racial injustice. The inclusion of the experiences of Latinos,
Native Americans, and Asian Americans in racial discourse can improve
CRT in several ways. First, a multiracial discourse permits a full
accounting of the problem of racial inequality and allows for the
construction of adequate remedies for racial subordination.96 Although all
people of color suffer racism, often in similar ways, racial hierarchies
impact communities of color in diverse ways. A narrow focus on
black/white subjugation severely limits the reach of antiracist remedies.
The black/white paradigm also prevents persons of color from engaging
in coalition politics.97 By treating racism as a problem that affects blacks
primarily (or exclusively), racial discourse in the United States divides
persons of color who could align to create formidable political forces in the
battle for racial justice.
Binary racial discourse also causes persons of color to compete for the
attention of whites, as marginalized racial groups treat racial justice as a

93. See id. (suggesting that a multidisciplinary approach avoids privileging some
experiences over others); see also Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis:
Mechanisms of Mutual Support Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251,
275 (2002) (reasoning that it is unlikely that someone would be subjugated in every possible
social hierarchy because of the multiple ways in which an individual can experience
privilege or subordination).
94. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, LatCrit at Five:
Institutionalizing a Postsubordination Future, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1249, 1267 (2001)
(describing multidimensionality as advancing prior theories such as intersectionality in
qualitative and quantitative ways).
95. See discussion supra note 76 (criticizing the black/white paradigm as
underinclusive and of limited utility).
96. See Chris K. Iijima, The Era of We-Construction: Reclaiming the Politics of Asian
Pacific American Identity and Reflections on the Critique of the Black/White Paradigm, 29
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 47, 68-69 (1997) (describing how immigration and the ensuing
changes in the racial makeup of U.S. society have exposed the ways in which the
black/white paradigm fails to provide an appropriate analytical framework).
97. See Perea, supra note 76, at 1256 (arguing that multiracial coalition politics depends
upon mutual understanding among persons of color and that the black/white paradigm
prevents the development of such understanding).
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zero-sum game.98 Instead of recognizing the pervasiveness and complexity
of racial injuries, binary racial discourse leads to the tyranny of oppression
ranking and to competing demands for centrality in a marginalized space of
racial victimization.
Recently, Critical Race Theorists, responding to the multiracial critics,
have attempted to contextualize binary racial discourse. Devon Carbado,
for example, recognizes the existence of the so-called black/white
paradigm but pushes its critics to consider that this paradigm privileges
whites and subordinates blacks.99 Because blacks and whites are situated
differently with respect to the black/white paradigm, their investment in
binary racial discourse likely serves diverging interests.100 If whites created
the paradigm, then directing multiracial critiques toward black scholars
might be misguided.
Furthermore, several scholars, including those who reject binary racial
politics, have documented the unique experiences of blacks in the
construction of racism in the United States.101 “Black exceptionalism”102
might provide a historical and sociological explanation for the
predominance of black/white racial discourse.
Also, resistance to multiracial discourse among blacks might exist
because non-black persons of color often benefit from white supremacy.
That is, non-black persons of color sometimes align themselves
ideologically and culturally with whites to elevate their status in a racially
hierarchical society.103 The embrace of racial hierarchy among people of

98. See Manning Marable, Beyond Racial Identity Politics: Toward a Liberation
Theory for Multicultural Democracy, in BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE: TRANSFORMING
AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICS 185, 190-91 (1995) (describing how this approach assumes
that one group can win only if another loses, which prevents groups from recognizing the
parallels in their experiences).
99. See Devon W. Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1283, 1306 (2002)
(urging critics to recognize the asymmetrical racially discriminatory relationship inherent in
the black/white paradigm, where whites are at the top and blacks are at the bottom).
100. Carbado argues that blacks adhere to the paradigm in order to discuss “Black
exceptionalism”—the unique harms endured by blacks in a system of white supremacy—
while whites promote white exceptionalism—the racist notion that blackness is
diametrically opposed to whiteness. See id. at 1311 (discussing the different roles of whites
and blacks with respect to the black/white paradigm).
101. See Frank H. Wu, Neither Black Nor White: Asian Americans and Affirmative
Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225, 245 (1995) (discussing a unique continuing legacy
of racism against African Americans, including chattel slavery, Jim Crow laws, and
institutional racism).
102. See Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Embracing the Tar-Baby–LatCrit Theory
and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1596 (1997) (coining the term “black
exceptionalism” to denote the idea that “African Americans play a unique and central role in
American social, political, cultural, and economic life, and have done so since the nation’s
founding”).
103. See Carbado, supra note 99, at 1310 (recognizing that a racial group may attempt to
distance itself from other racial groups for pragmatic political reasons, or to engage the legal
system on its own terms).

HUTCHINSON.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

1202

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/17/2005 11:21:16 AM

[Vol. 53:1187

color and white-supremacist privileging (even if shifting and extremely
limited) of non-black communities of color impede the willingness of
blacks to engage in multiracial discourse.
Furthermore, black experiences are relevant to the experiences of other
persons of color for two reasons. First, anti-black racism provides an
institutional and historical framework for the subordination of non-black
persons of color.104 Much of the racial hierarchy in the United States was
concretized during slavery—though not exclusively.105 The formation of a
rigid racial caste structure in the black/white context legitimizes racist
practices against all persons of color.106 Second, persons of color do not
exist in mutually exclusive groups. Latino communities, for example, have
large populations of persons of African descent; thus, it is difficult to
bifurcate Latino and black experiences.107 Abolishing the black/white
paradigm, therefore, might preclude analysis of the unique experiences
facing black Latinos.
Ultimately, however, the exclusive deployment of a binary black/white
paradigm artificially narrows racial discourse and harms racial justice
efforts. In order to construct adequate antiracist theories and to develop
effective remedies for racial injustice, Critical Race Theorists must
excavate the multidimensional harms that racial injustice causes, including
harms that are racial but not endured by blacks. Furthermore, progressive
racial politics can only survive with broad political support. The most
likely support for progressive racial change comes from persons of color.
Yet, the deep divisions that result from binary racial politics hinders the
formation of helpful antiracist alliances. Finally, a multiracial discourse
may help blacks demonstrate the pervasiveness of racial inequality. Whites
tend to view racism as a relic of prior generations, and they often respond
to blacks’ claims of ongoing racial injustice with suspicion.108 Moreover,
104. See, e.g., Janine Young Kim, Note, Are Asians Black?: The Asian-American Civil
Rights Agenda and the Contemporary Significance of the Black/White Paradigm, 108 YALE
L.J. 2385, 2400-01 (1999) (arguing that the paradigm is integral to understanding how
power and domination create racial hierarchies, and how non-black groups’ histories
intersect with the history of African Americans).
105. See id. at 2400 (noting that the most vivid example of white supremacy, “[t]he
history of the kidnapping, enslavement, and subhuman treatment of Africans by White
European Americans,” is historically linked to the birth of the nation).
106. See id. at 2400-01 (recognizing that current racial hierarchies arise from the legacy
of African American subjugation and its intersection with the histories of other groups).
107. See generally Tanya Katerí Hernández, Multiracial Matrix: The Role of Race
Ideology in the Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Laws, A United States-Latin America
Comparison, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1093 (2002) (comparing U.S. and Latin American models
of race, and discussing how racial classifications exist even in the absence of any public
focus on race).
108. See Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and
the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 981 (1993) (arguing that
whites tend to believe that race discrimination is a thing of the past, that the situation has
improved, and that race-neutrality is pervasive).
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in a white-supremacist culture, binary racial discourse obscures the
experiences of discrimination experienced by Latinos and Asian
Americans.109 As a result, whites argue that blacks should emulate “model
minorities,” usually Asian Americans, who either do not suffer from racism
or do not believe that racism injures them enough to oppose it on a political
level.110 Binary racial discourse therefore allows whites to discredit blacks’
claims of racism by offering Asian Americans as proof that the United
States has eradicated racial injustice, or that blacks can easily overcome
what “little” racism still exists. Multiracial discourse, however, offers a
powerful rebuttal to this negative and deceitful discourse. By portraying
the complexity of racial inequality, Critical Race Theorists can counter a
white-supremacist narrative that disparages blacks’ assertions of racial
injustice by deploying model minority constructs.111
4.

Progressive race blindness
A more recent discussion within CRT surrounds the embrace of race
consciousness among Critical Race Theorists.112 Unlike conservatives who
critique race consciousness to oppose remedies for racial injustice, internal
critics who favor the abolition of race possess liberal and progressive
credentials. The “progressive race blindness” critics argue that because
race is socially constructed, Critical Race Theorists can discard it as an
element of identity and theory.113 Furthermore, the progressive race
blindness critics point to the negative uses of race and argue that Critical

109. See discussion supra note 76 (observing the limitations of the black/white
paradigm).
110. See Wu, supra note 101, at 239-40 (discussing how by becoming like whites,
Asians are now expected to acquiesce to white supremacy).
111. See id. at 244-46 (critiquing the model minority myth as ignoring historical
discrimination, differential racial experiences, differences among Asian communities, and
actual experiences of discrimination).
112. See, e.g., Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Shifting Race-Consciousness Matrix and
the Multiracial Category Movement, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231 (2000) (asserting that
the only reason race exists is because people repeatedly and consciously think about race).
Robinson argues that racism and white supremacy stem from race consciousness and related
behavior. Id. at 233-34. See also Richard T. Ford, Race As Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA
L. REV. 1803, 1806 (2000) (explaining that race consciousness proponents reject the notion
that race does not exist and instead purport the existence of racial categories that delineate
political and social groups); K. Anthony Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood
Connections, in K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMAN, COLOR CONSCIOUSNESS: THE
POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 30, 31 (1996) (arguing that in order to diffuse racism people
must first overcome their own racial identities); e. christi cunningham, The “Racing” Cause
of Action and the Identity Formally Known as Race: The Road to Tamazunchale, 30
RUTGERS L.J. 707, 713 (1999) (contending that race matters because race identity can be
both useful in fighting racism as well as a tool for oppression). I have written extensively
on these critiques in another article. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Progressive Race
Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1455
(2001).
113. Hutchinson, supra note 112, at 1459-60.
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Race Theorists should abandon race-talk.114 Progressive race blindness
theorists typically believe (though they do not speak uniformly) that
because racism has served as a source of deprivation and brutality, people
of color perpetuate their own marginalization when they continue to
construct their identities around race.115 Some progressive race blindness
critics have even argued that race consciousness, rather than structural
racism and economic injustice, causes cycles of poverty among persons of
color.116 When persons of color embrace race consciousness, they accept a
script of racial subordination and, performing their assigned roles in racial
hierarchy, “co-create” poverty.117 Other advocates of progressive race
blindness argue that race consciousness breeds essentialism, social
divisions, and alienation.118
Several Critical Race Theorists have responded to the progressive race
blindness critiques.119 The primary responses acknowledge the social
construction of race but also assert that race, although socially constructed,
materially affects the lives of persons of color and that the deconstruction
of race cannot eradicate the existence of racial hierarchy and inequality.120
Critical Race Theorists also have argued that race blindness deprives
persons of color of an organizational tool to contest racism. Without the
language of race, persons of color cannot adequately describe their
experiences with racism or generate political activism to contest racist
institutions.121 By framing race consciousness as inherently negative—a
contradictory stance to take if one seriously views race as socially
constructed, malleable, and capable of discarding—progressive race
114. See id. at 1461 (explaining that progressive race blindness advocates believe that
the concept and use of race weakens people’s identities and promotes “inferiority,
victimization, and helplessness among persons of color”).
115. See id. (discussing the views of progressive race blindness theorists such as e.
christi cunningham and Reginald Leamon Robinson).
116. See, e.g., Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Underclass and the Role of Race
Consciousness: A New Age Critique of Black Wealth/White Wealth and American
Apartheid, 34 IND. L. REV. 1377, 1432 (2001) (proposing that individuals use their own
“self-empowering philosophy” to experience either poverty or wealth).
117. Id.
118. See Hutchinson, supra note 112, at 1461-62 (noting that progressive race blindness
advocates believe that race consciousness alienates individuals from their “true” self and
alienates communities by dividing the population).
119. See generally id. at 1465-75 (refuting progressive race blindness scholars’ claim
that race consciousness is dangerous ); Hernández-Truyol, supra note 80, at 921 (discussing
the Latina/o experience of race, ethnicity, and culture in America and comparing that
American experience to one in a Latin American country); Jayne Chong-Soon Lee,
Navigating the Topology of Race, 46 STAN. L. REV. 747, 747 (1994) (asserting that fighting
racism requires a recognition of the various definitions of race and an understanding that the
meaning of race continually shifts).
120. See Hutchinson, supra note 112, at 1473-75 (critiquing Robinson for failing to
recognize that racism is structural; thus, even if people were able to erase race from their
consciousness, the negative and persistent impact of racism would still be present).
121. See Lee, supra note 119, at 772 (arguing that “race” unites communities of color).

HUTCHINSON.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

2004]

1/17/2005 11:21:16 AM

CRITICAL RACE HISTORIES: IN AND OUT

1205

blindness scholars ignore its potentially positive uses for persons of
color.122
Finally, advocates of progressive race blindness ignore the
multidimensionality of subordination in their efforts to rid society of race,
while remaining neutral toward other socially constructed categories of
identity, such as gender and sexuality.123 Because identity categories are
interconnected, it is impossible to abolish race without considering the
identity categories that coexist with and that contextualize racial identity.124
B. Backlash Against CRT: External Critiques
During November 1997, Yale Law School hosted a conference that
commemorated the tenth anniversary of the earliest published work in
CRT. The Yale conference took place in the context of very visible,
public, and strident critiques of CRT.
In an essay published at that time by the New Republic, for example,
United States Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner argues that Critical Race
Theorists appear to be “whiners and wolf-criers,” “labile and intellectually
limited,” “divisive,” and “weak.”125 Posner asserts that Critical Race
theorists’ scholarship is “inaccurate” and marred by “extremism . . .
paranoia . . . hysteria . . . and irrationalism.”126 At the conclusion of his
essay, which is ostensibly a review of Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry’s
Beyond All Reason,127 a critique of progressive scholarship, including CRT,
Posner charges that CRT “is a disgrace to legal education” and an
“embarrassment to sober liberal egalitarians . . . .”128 These impassioned
reflections come from the same individual who believes that “model”
scholarship must, among other things, be “unstrident [and]
unpolemical . . . .”129 Either Posner has discarded his model, or there is
something inherent to CRT that renders “model” criticism ineffective and
destabilized.
United States Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski offers another spirited,
though less inflamed, critique of CRT in the New York Times.130 Like
122. Id.
123. See Hutchinson, supra note 112, at 1469-71 (noting that progressive race blindness
scholars tailor many of their arguments toward persons of color, implying that race
consciousness is a problem among persons of color).
124. Id. at 1470.
125. Richard A. Posner, The Skin Trade, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40.
126. Id.
127. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE
RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997).
128. Posner, supra note 125, at 40.
129. Richard A. Posner, Should There Be Homosexual Marriage? And If So, Who
Should Decide?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1578, 1578 (1997).
130. Alex Kozinski, Bending the Law: Are Radical Multiculturalists Poisoning Young
Legal Minds?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, § 7, at 46.

HUTCHINSON.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

1206

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/17/2005 11:21:16 AM

[Vol. 53:1187

Posner, Kozinski purports to review Farber and Sherry’s work, but he
directs most of his efforts toward criticizing CRT de novo. Kozinski
asserts that “radical multiculturalists,”131 among whom he includes Critical
Race Theorists, are “loud and militant” and “they brand those who oppose
them as sexist, racist or worse.”132
As this cursory review indicates, the conservative critics and their
critiques of CRT are well-placed. Moreover, the critiques tend to depart
from a strict analytical engagement with the particulars of critical race
scholarship, and degenerate into personal, often vitriolic, attacks. Yet,
these facts alone do not completely explain the concern these critiques
engendered. Rather, the most troubling aspect of the conservative critiques
of CRT surrounds the many distortions they make concerning the general
themes of critical race scholarship and about the analyses of specific works
within this vast body of diverse literature. The articles tend to follow a
common, almost predictable, pattern with regard to their observations about
CRT proper. As the critiques go, CRT is: (1) a collection of stories,
narratives, and anecdotes, usually poorly written;133 (2) “nihilistic” and
irreversibly cynical with respect to the possibility of racial reconciliation;134
and (3) anti-foundational, completely disavowing claims of truth and
objectivity and the possibility of legal change.135
Typically, the conservative critiques cite the work of particular Critical
Race Theorists to “prove” their claims about the general themes of CRT.
These critiques invariably center upon the work of a few prominent
theorists. Seemingly, no critique of CRT would be complete without a
discussion of Patricia Williams and her analysis of the Tawana Brawley
controversy,136 Richard Delgado and his advocacy of narrative
scholarship,137 Regina Austin and her analysis of black criminality,138 and
131. The term appears in Farber and Sherry’s analysis of critical race theory. See
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 127, at 5 (defining “radical multiculturalists” as those
scholars who are politically progressive, adhere to various theories including CRT,
feminism, and “legal writing about gays and lesbians,” and believe that reality is “subjective
and socially constructed”).
132. Kozinski, supra note 130, at 46.
133. See Posner, supra note 125, at 40, 42 (explaining that the use of stories and
narratives in CRT in effect removes any “rational inquiry” and allows Critical Race
Theorists to exaggerate the problem of discussing race in America).
134. See generally Andrew Sullivan, Truth and Lies in the Language Class, SUNDAY
TIMES (London), Jan. 12, 1997, at 1.
135. See generally FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 127 (critiquing flaws in the work of
“radical multiculturalists” as serious).
136. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW
PROFESSOR 169-78 (1991) (discussing the story of a fifteen-year-old black girl who was
found after a four day disappearance with racial slurs written on her body). The controversy
concerned whether the girl was actually raped or whether she made up the story. Id. A
grand jury investigation concluded that she fabricated the entire story, which called into
question the credibility of black women alleging rape by white men. Id.
137. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
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Derrick Bell and his skeptical stance toward racial progress and his use of
narrative.139
The outsider critiques of CRT have generated a host of intellectual
debates within and outside of CRT as scholars have countered many of the
claims that conservatives have made concerning critical race analysis. This
Part considers the more prominent themes in anti-CRT scholarship and
discusses how Critical Race Theorists and other progressive scholars have
addressed these critiques.
1.

Critique of storytelling
Several Critical Race Theorists have utilized narratives in their research,
personal or otherwise, and have urged legal theorists to incorporate
narrative as a legitimate methodological tool.140 Critical Race Theorists
who advocate the employment of narratives argue that such stories can lead
to greater understanding of the experiences of disadvantaged social groups,
whose life experiences the law obfuscates.141
The storytelling and narrative strand of critical race scholarship, though
never the most ubiquitous methodology within CRT, has been the most
provocative for conservative critics. Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, for
example, have written extensive critiques of storytelling used by many
legal theorists, including Critical Race Theorists and feminist theorists.142
The critics of storytelling argue that personal stories do not advance
analysis because other scholars cannot contest them; they are not grounded
in empiricism; and they are inapplicable in a legal setting where analytical
reasoning pervades.143
Critical Race Theorists and other progressive scholars have responded by
arguing that the focus on storytelling among CRT’s conservative critics
distorts reality because CRT largely does not rely upon storytelling or
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2414 (1988) (arguing that through narrative and stories,
people of color can gain the insight and strength needed to fight the stigma of racism).
138. See Regina Austin, “The Black Community,” Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of
Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1774-75 (1989) (urging today’s black community to
create a new identity that acknowledges notions of black lawbreaking and criminality).
139. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 52, at 373-74 (describing “racial realism” as the notion
that for people of color, the status quo is not likely to improve, because forces will continue
to maintain the white-over-black supremacy in society, and urging others to accept this
reality and adopt new strategies accordingly).
140. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 137, at 2411 (1988) (urging storytelling as a means to
challenge the status quo and create a new reality where life is full of more possibility).
Stories are effective because instead of being coercive, they enable the reader to judge the
truth. Id. at 2415.
141. See id. at 2439-40 (explaining that stories of minorities to help remove race and
class based walls of isolation).
142. See generally FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 127, at 88-94 (arguing that because
storytelling is personal, no real criticism of storytelling scholarship can be given without
implicating, and ultimately insulting, the storyteller).
143. Id. at 89-90.
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narrative.144 Instead, CRT engages almost exclusively in policy, doctrinal,
or theoretical analysis.145 Furthermore, Critical Race Theorists have
demonstrated that the use of narrative as a rhetorical tool in intellectual
scholarship has existed for millennia; thus, focusing the anti-storytelling
critique upon CRT and feminist theorists seems disingenuous and
ideological.146 Also, Critical Race Theorists have argued that law, in many
respects, depends upon narrative in practice. A criminal trial, for example,
advances competing narratives through the usage of physical evidence,
testimony, and framing of the “facts” in opening and closing statements.147
2.

Critique of nihilism
The conservative assertion that CRT is nihilistic seems immediately
problematic. The emergence of CRT as a coherent body of legal theory
resulted because Critical Race Theorists who worked in the CLS movement
did not accept the “rights-trashing” approach of some CLS scholars.148
While CLS wanted to abandon the rights approach, Critical Race Theorists
recognized and wrote passionately about the value of rights in the history
of persons of color and their struggles against racist deprivation.149
Nevertheless, many conservative critiques of CRT argue that CRT does
not embrace the “rule of law” and that it portrays the law as unable to bring
about positive social change.150 The responses to the nihilism critique
144. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply To Farber and
Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REV. 665, 668-69 (1993) (noting that only one-quarter of CRT
scholarship is written in narrative form, thereby dispelling Farber and Sherry’s harsh
criticism of CRT’s emphasis on storytelling). Delgado also attacks Farber and Sherry’s
notion that storytelling does not provide any analysis or reasoning, noting that most stories
include “statistics, case authority, and doctrinal analysis.” Id. at 669-70. See also Alex M.
Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice of Color:
Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REV. 803, 845
(1994) (supporting the use of storytelling in CRT because it provides a “Voice of Color”
which is necessary to articulate “the unique insights that come from the duality inherent in
the existence of any person of color”).
145. Delgado, supra note 144, at 668-69.
146. See id. at 666 (“Empowered groups long ago established a host of stories,
narratives, conventions, and understandings that today, through repetition, seem natural and
true.”).
147. See, e.g., Michael A. Coffino, Genre, Narrative and Judgment: Legal and Protest
Song Stories in Two Criminal Cases, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 679, 686-89 (noting that both
judges and lawyers use stories to explain legal facts and effectively respond to existing legal
perceptions); Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity
in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 39 (1994) (urging lawyers and legal scholars to
engage in storytelling as a way to provide clarity, given the large amount of information that
they must present).
148. See Hutchinson, supra note 112, at 1476-77 (explaining that Critical Race Theorists
believe that increasing rights for minorities is vital to achieve racial justice).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
150. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 127, at 35, 38 (criticizing multiculturalist legal
thinkers for abandoning legal reasoning as a mechanism to bring change and instead turning
to storytelling as their method of persuasion); Rosen, supra note 19, at 27 (criticizing
Critical Race Theorists’ belief that the legal process is ineffective in bringing about change
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uncover the fallacies of these claims by pointing to the divergence of
Critical Race Theorists from more radical forms of poststructuralism
practiced by CLS scholars who engage in rights trashing.151
3.

Critique of nonneutrality
Critical Race Theorists have utilized postmodern analysis to contest the
law’s claim to objectivity and neutrality—a hallmark of CLS thought.152
Because analytical reasoning occurs in a social, historical, and political
context, the “truth” is a contingent and elusive concept.153
Conservative critics have capitalized on CRT’s critique of objectivity,
arguing that CRT does not believe in the “truth” or in reasoning.154 Yet, an
argument that the “truth” is socially constructed or contingent does not
necessitate the abolition of reasoning.155 Instead, as Critical Race Theorists
have asserted, skepticism toward reasoning means that we should make
tentative and more contextualized our accounts of law and racism, rather
than accepting grand or totalizing theories that purport to apply to all
situations, irrespective of historical, social, political, and economic
context.156 Intersectionality and multidimensionality, for example, criticize
the sweeping reform agendas of CRT, feminist theory, and queer theory
that overlook the relationships among race, gender, class, and sexuality.
Yet, these scholars remain committed to engaging legal institutions as
potential sites for progressive social change.157

because society’s perception of facts is contingent on race and their belief that neutral laws
only advance white domination).
151. See Robert L. Hayman, The Color of Tradition: Critical Race Theory and
Postmodern Constitutional Traditionalism, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 68 (1995)
(explaining that although Critical Race Theorists are divided over whether racial justice is a
feasible goal, they are “united by some form of antisubordination theory, and all insist upon
the necessity of struggle”) (internal citation omitted).
152. See supra text accompanying note 42.
153. See Hayman, supra note 151, at 60-62 (discussing postmodern and CRT skepticism
of “truth” and objectivity).
154. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 127, at 35, 95-96 (criticizing Patricia William’s
interpretation of the Tawana Brawley controversy).
155. See Harris, supra note 42, at 765 (noting the blending of postmodern skepticism and
modern reasoning in CRT).
156. See Hayman, supra note 151, at 63-64 (stating that Critical Race Theorists are
attempting to include discussions about “new histories, narratives, and counter-myths” in
the majoritarian jurisprudence dialogue) (internal citation omitted).
157. See Crenshaw, supra note 53, at 1331 (supporting the civil rights movement’s
strategy of urging legal reform as a means to achieve greater racial equality); Roberts, supra
note 50, at 1480 (noting feminist legal theory’s position that privacy laws that punish
women for their reproductive choices should be struck down); Hutchinson, Identity Crisis,
supra note at 89, at 309 (discussing legal arguments made in intersectionality literature).
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C. Critical Engagement: Dealing With Unfinished Business
Despite efforts to rebut many of the conservative critiques of CRT, the
project of considering conservative and internal critiques remains
unfinished. Internal critics, as the progressive race blindness movement
demonstrates, continue to challenge the assumptions of CRT from a
progressive perspective. One recent strand of internal criticism argues that
multiplicity theories marginalize a desperately needed analysis of class
within CRT. This critique remains largely unexplored. Furthermore, more
established conservative critiques, such as the critique of nihilism, could
receive a fresh examination. The remainder of this Part addresses these
two criticisms.
1.

The dichotomy of multiplicity theories and class analysis
Internal critics continue to contribute to the evolution of CRT. Recent
internal critiques have argued that CRT has abandoned class or materialist
analysis. Richard Delgado—whose work is among the most influential in
CRT—has urged Critical Race Theorists to engage in class analysis by
directing their attention to the material consequences of racial
subordination.158 In two recent articles, Delgado argues that class theory is
marginalized by discussions of “unconscious racism”159 and from
multiplicity identity theories.160 Furthermore, at the CRT Workshop held at
the Washington College of Law in 2003, Daria Roithmayer presented a
paper that similarly criticized CRT for failing to undertake class analysis.161
Roithmayer, like Delgado, argued that multiplicity theories have
supplanted materiality concerns.
Delgado and Roithmayer make powerful observations regarding the need
for class analysis within CRT. Race and class relate to each other in three
important ways. First, racism causes economic deprivation. Virtually
every statistical measure of economic well-being shows that persons of
color are worse off than whites.162 An abundance of social science research
158. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Crossroads and Blind Alleys: A Critical Examination
of Recent Writing About Race, 82 TEX. L. REV. 121, 151 (2003).
159. See generally Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think about Race: Reflections on the
Id, the Ego, and Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO. L.J. 2279, 2289,
2291 (2001).
160. See Delgado, supra note 158, at 122, 124, 127-28 (arguing that the attention of
theorists on intersectionality and essentialism issues, along with race and sexual orientation
studies, impedes class analysis).
161. At the time of publication, a formal draft was not available for citation.
162. See, e.g., ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE,
HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992) (citing statistics that show that earnings in white households are
higher than earnings in black households and that even among similarly educated whites and
blacks, the income of whites is much higher); ORLANDO PATTERSON, THE ORDEAL OF
INTEGRATION: PROGRESS AND RESENTMENT IN AMERICA’S “RACIAL” CRISIS 25 (1997)
(discussing income statistics based on race, including that in 1995, the median income of all
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links these disparities to racial injustice.163 Second, the combination of race
and poverty exacerbates the inequality of poor people of color.164
Sociological research reveals that poor persons of color, unlike poor
whites, tend to live in areas of concentrated poverty, where they lack access
to important social resources, such as adequate education, housing, and
employment opportunities.165 The lack of stabilizing social resources in
these communities, as well as the inattention of U.S. power structures,
leads to ongoing generational poverty.166 Finally, imperial capitalism has
figured prominently in the subordination of persons of color. The
decimation of Native Americans, the enslavement of Africans, the
exploitation of Asian “immigrant” labor, and the conquest of Latinos
through westward expansion all demonstrate the linkage of race and class
domination.167
Due to this relationship between class and race, Critical Race Theorists
should heed the advice of Delgado, Roithmayer, and other scholars whose
work engages race and class. Critical Race Theorists should undertake the
task of engaging class inequality and advocate for legal doctrines and
policies that promote substantive, rather than formal equality. While many
Critical Race Theorists have engaged in class research,168 Delgado and
Roithmayer correctly note the deficiency of sustained inquiry in this area
within CRT.
African American families was 60.8%of the median income of European American
families—only a 1.6% improvement from the 1967 ratio).
163. See generally WILLIAM J. WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE
NEW URBAN POOR 111-12 (linking class and racial inequality).
164. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 136-37 (1987) (explaining that a person’s race and class
group determines whether the person will have access to “organizational channels of
privilege and influence”); WILSON, supra note 163, at 196 (claiming that minorities do not
have the resources to compete in the open job market because of the crushing effects of the
challenges that they face due to their race and poverty).
165. DOUGLASS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
166. See WILSON, supra note 163, at 49 (explaining that the Reagan and Bush
administrations decreased spending on direct aid to cities, including programs such as
“general revenue sharing, urban mass-transit, public service jobs and job training,
compensatory education, social service, block grants, local public works, economic
development assistance, and urban development action grants”).
167. See Tayyab Mahmud, Colonialism and Modern Constructions of Race: A
Preliminary Inquiry, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1219 (1999) (linking racial construction to
colonial exploitation).
168. See, e.g., Regina Austin, “Step on a Crack, Break Your Mother’s Back”: Poor
Moms, Myths of Authority, and Drug-Related Evictions from Public Housing, 14 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 273 (2002) (discussing how poor minority women living in public housing are
disadvantaged by the government’s no-fault eviction policy); Jerome Culp, Colorblind
Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as
Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162, 177-82 (1994) (explaining that the policy of
colorblindness is ineffective in changing the racial status quo that exists); Dorothy Roberts,
Irrationality and Sacrifice in Welfare Reform Consensus, 81 VA. L. REV. 2607 (1995)
(showing how conservative “welfare reform policies” hurt black children).
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While this Article generally agrees with Delgado and Roithmayer’s plea
for class analysis, it takes a different approach to the role of multiplicity
theories in marginalizing class analysis. This divergence may seem minor,
but it is ultimately vital for theorizing on the relationship between race and
class. In Delgado and Roithmayer’s critique of multiplicity theories, both
theorists conflate multiplicity with a focus on identity—rather than a focus
on structures of subordination.169 Although Delgado and Roithmayer
correctly note that many multiplicity theorists focus attention on “identity
construction,” writings in multidimensionality and intersectionality have
not exclusively focused on questions of status. Instead, these bodies of
literature have sought not only to complicate questions of identity but also
to demonstrate that structures of subordination themselves are
multidimensional. The multidimensionality literature also asserts that
Critical Race Theorists cannot fully understand racism and all of its
material harms without engaging structures of patriarchy, heterosexism,
and economic domination.170 Furthermore, class, along with race, seems
like a probable place for identity construction as well.171 In addition,
multiplicity theories can explain why poor persons of color tend to remain
poor, while poor whites have greater opportunities for economic
advancement,172 or why women of color are the poorest segment of United
States society.173 The explanation for these social realities rests on an
appreciation of the multidimensionality of race and class. So, identity
theorists can, and should, take class into account when describing the
processes of social construction that create racial identities. Furthermore,
Critical Race Theorists need not engage in an either/or proposition of
forsaking identity or multiplicity for class analysis. It is possible to engage
in both types of analyses.174 Accordingly, multiplicity theories can serve
an important role in a critical race analysis that emphasizes class.
169. Delgado, supra note 158, at 122, 124, 127.
170. See Hutchinson, supra note 75, at 10 (arguing that multidimensionality treats
oppression as “complex and multilayered”).
171. See, e.g., Martha Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest, and
the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799, 803-04 (2003) (explaining that
classes obtain their identity from their economic position, their shared understanding and
their shared action); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 8, 19 (1991) (arguing that because the identities
of whiteness and the working class arose simultaneously, there is a presumption of
whiteness with the term worker).
172. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
173. See Laura M. Padilla, Intersectionality and Positionality: Situating Women of
Color in the Affirmative Action Dialogue, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 886 (1997) (explaining
that women of color earn less than white women, and that only lower paid work is generally
available for women of color).
174. Even Delgado has written on the problem of essentialism and the black/white
paradigm. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture,
Latino-Critical Scholarship, and the Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1181 (1997)
(arguing that binary racial discourse perpetuates racial subordination); Richard Delgado,
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2.

Critique of nihilism revisited
While many Critical Race Theorists have responded to the conservative
characterization of CRT as being nihilistic, this Article supplements these
responses with empirical research that justifies CRT’s suspicion of law as a
site of social change. Although CRT criticizes legal structures, Critical
Race Theorists rely on law and legal reasoning as instruments for antiracist
agendas.175 Rebuttals to the antinihilism argument have centered on this
dual consciousness of CRT.176
While these responses to conservative critiques of CRT’s cynicism are
effective, Critical Race Theorists could bolster their arguments by pointing
to political science data that demonstrate the majoritarian nature of the
Court’s decision making. Rather than protecting disadvantaged classes
through the judicial review process, the Court responds primarily to
majoritarian concerns,177 thus hindering the attainment of social justice.178
Although some Critical Race Theorists have demonstrated the majoritarian
nature of the Court through doctrinal analysis,179 several political scientists
have conducted substantial empirical research, which fortifies the doctrinal
Rodrigo’s Sixth Chronicle: Intersections, Essences, and the Dilemma of Social Reform, 68
N.Y.U. L. REV. 639 (1993) (discussing the complexity of identity politics).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
177. See, e.g., THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 192-93
(1989) (“Overall, the evidence suggests that the modern Court has been an essentially
majoritarian institution. Where clear poll margins exist, three-fifths to two-thirds of Court
rulings reflect the polls.”); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 239 (2002) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s
rulings represent public opinion because the justices are chosen by the President, who is
elected by the people); David G. Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial
Decision Making in the Post-New Deal Period, 47 J. POL. 652, 662 (1985) (arguing that
despite its reputation as a countermajoritarian institution, the post-New Deal Court has been
largely majoritarian or, if not, has rendered decisions consistent with emerging trends in
public opinion); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a
Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court
Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87, 97 (1993) (explaining that by ruling according to the
policy opinions of the majority, the Supreme Court reinforces and legitimizes majoritarian
opinions and concerns); Helmut Norpoth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Popular Influence on Supreme
Court Decisions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 711 (1994) (noting that out of 130 Supreme Court
decisions for which public opinion of the issue was known, 63% of the Court’s decisions
correlated to the majoritarian opinion).
178. See GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND
MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 27, 31 (1993) (arguing that because many
challenges to majoritarian laws and policies are equal protection claims that receive the
deferential rational basis scrutiny, the Supreme Court can easily abide by majoritarian
preferences in its legal reasoning, to the detriment of minorities); Hutchinson, supra note 75,
at 618 (critiquing equal protection doctrine as protecting dominant, rather than minority,
interests); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty, Affirmative Action,
Sodomy, and Supreme Court Politics, 23 LAW & INEQ. 1 (forthcoming 2004) (demonstrating
how equal protection doctrine harms social justice efforts and sides with dominant
interests).
179. See, e.g., Spann, supra note 36, at 1426-36 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
standing decisions to illustrate that the Court rules in favor of majority interests).
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research of Critical Race Theorists.180 For example, when public opinion
polls are available, they show that the Court makes decisions that largely
reflect majoritarian public viewpoints.181 This relationship between the
Court and public opinion exists even in the civil rights context, where
minority interests should matter more under traditional conceptions of
judicial review.182
Thus, as several Critical Race Theorists have
demonstrated through extensive doctrinal analysis, the Court does not
exercise judicial review to protect politically vulnerable classes from
majoritarian abuse. Instead, the Court’s doctrine facilitates majoritarian
interests. This aspect of judicial review lends support to critical race
skepticism of law as a viable instrument of progressive social change.
IV. CONTINUING THE EVOLUTIONARY PROJECT: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE ESSAYS IN THIS SYMPOSIUM
The works in this Symposium advance the evolutionary project of CRT.
Regina Austin makes an extremely timely and compelling contribution to
this Symposium, given ongoing debates within CRT concerning the need
for class analysis. Austin’s work on the exploitation of poor persons of
color in capital markets demonstrates the ongoing commitment of critical
race scholars to class analysis.
Brant Lee’s “network economic analysis” unveils the structural
dimensions of whiteness, thus furthering CRT’s understanding of racism as
a product of institutional, ideological, and cultural sources, rather than
atomistic acts by “bad” individuals. Lee’s article demonstrates the
pervasiveness, fluidity, and subtlety of whiteness as a societal norm and the
need for concerted efforts to dismantle racial inequality that transcends the
enactment of mere formal equality regimes.
Reginald Oh’s deconstructionist reading of the Court’s affirmative action
jurisprudence unveils how equal protection doctrine obscures the
geographic spheres of white racial domination. Oh’s rich analysis unveils
how the Court’s myopic equal protection doctrine falsely portrays blacks,
concentrated in urban areas, as “politically powerful” for purposes of a
process theory/heightened scrutiny analysis.

180. See Barnum, supra note 177, at 656-61 (tracking public opinion over time and its
correlation to Supreme Court decisions); Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 177, at 90
(discussing the statistical methodology of examining the relationship between public
opinion and Supreme Court rulings).
181. MARSHALL, supra note 177, at 192-93; SEGAL, supra note 177, at 239; Barnum,
supra note 177, at 662.
182. See, e.g., Thomas R. Marshall & Joseph Ignagni, Supreme Court and Public
Support for Rights Claims, 78 JUDICATURE 146, 151 (1994) (urging reconsideration of the
argument that judicial review protects the civil rights and civil liberties of unpopular
minorities).
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Reginald Leamon Robinson’s contribution renews the author’s status as
an unrepentant, internal critic of the deployment of race consciousness
among Critical Race Theorists. Robinson’s provocative work urges
Critical Race Theorists to abandon race consciousness, and it advances the
belief that race-talk will inevitably fail to eradicate the inequality among
whites and persons of color.
The organizers of the Washington College of Law CRT Workshop
wanted to invigorate CRT and to create a forum for discussing race in a
creative fashion. Collectively, these texts advance these goals. The articles
push critical race analysis into new directions, while adhering to the
foundational themes that have defined CRT. The articles focus outwardly
by challenging white-supremacist domination, but they also focus inwardly
by questioning cherished tenets of CRT. Recently, other law reviews have
dedicated issues to CRT.183 Hopefully, these publications will spark new
theories and innovations among Critical Race Theorists and assist in the
development of strategies to combat the intractable problem of racial
injustice and inequality.

183. E.g., Symposium, Theorizing the Connections Among Systems of Subordination
Responses & Commentary, 71 UMKC L. REV. 227 (2002).

